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Abstract—The term gestalt, when used in the context of gen-
eral systems theory, assumes the value of “systemic touchstone”,
namely a figure of reference useful to categorize the properties or
qualities of a set of systems. Typical gestalts used, e.g., in biology,
are those based on anatomical or physiological characteristics,
which correspond respectively to architectural and organizational
design choices in natural and artificial systems. In this paper
we discuss three gestalts of general systems theory: behavior,
organization, and substance, which refer respectively to the works
of Wiener, Boulding, and Leibniz. Our major focus here is the
system introduced by the latter. Through a discussion of some
of the elements of the Leibnitian System, and by means of
several novel interpretations of those elements in terms of today’s
computer science, we highlight the debt that contemporary
research still has with this Giant among the giant scholars of
the past.
I. INTRODUCTION
General Systems Theory [. . . ] hopes to develop
something like a “spectrum” of theories—a system of
systems which may perform the function of a “gestalt”
in theoretical construction. Such “gestalts” in special
fields have been of great value in directing research
towards the gaps which they reveal.
General Systems Theory—The Skeleton of Science
K. BOULDING
The notion of a General Systems Theory is no recent
invention. Already Aristotle proposed a tentative classification
of “systems”. A common aspect between Aristotle’s and all
the classifications that followed is the use of one or more
systemic touchstones, namely privileged aspects that provide
the classifier with “scales” to diversify systems along one
or more dimensions. A common term used to refer to such
touchstones is gestalt1 [2].
Not only the Great One started the discussion, but he
also set most of its subsequent “rules” by classifying systems
according to several anatomical (that is, architectural) and
physiological (organizational) gestalts. Remarkably enough,
Aristotle realized that a discussion purely based on the above
aspects would not be complete, and suggested to make use
as gestalts also of behavior, purpose, and teleology—the very
same touchstones at the core of the renowned article [3] by
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow. He was also the first to put
the accent on social behaviors by writing about mutualistic
relationships between individuals [4]. This second type of
gestalts put their privileged focus on the characteristics and
1German: “Essence or shape of an entity’s complete form” [1].
the quality of the emerging products of systems rather than
on their structural, i.e., constitutive, peculiarities; thus on
dynamic aspects rather than on static design choices. Quality
in particular is expressed as the result of a match with a
deployment environment, which in turn may be assumed to
be static or vary with time.
As postulates in a geometry or the axioms in a conceptual
system, gestalts define the way we address a given problem and
set the boundaries of what we can prove in it. Furthermore, as
already mentioned, they have “great value in directing research
towards the gaps which they reveal” [2].
The present contribution exemplifies three well-known
general systems theories: the behavioral system of Wiener et
al. [3] (Sect. II); the behavioral-organizational categorization
of Boulding [2] (Sect. III); and, in Sect. IV, the system of
Leibniz, based on the behavioral-architectural-organizational
gestalt he refers to as “substance”. In each section we briefly
discuss the system classifications stemming from the adopted
gestalt and highlight the research directions that they revealed.
In particular in Sect. IV we provide a number of modern-
day interpretations of the major concepts in the philosophy of
Leibniz.
Our conclusions are drawn in Sect. V, where we highlight
how the system of Leibniz anticipated several of the research
directions that emerged with the birth of the computer era,
to the point that modern computer science time and again
provides a useful interpretation of the concepts found in
Leibniz’s philosophy. In particular, we reflect on recent results
such as the ones in companion paper [5] and point out our
personal debt with the Leibnitian System.
II. BEHAVIOR
In their renowned paper [3] Rosenblueth, Wiener, and
Bigelow introduce the concept of the “behavioristic study of
natural events” and propose a classification of systems that
focuses on the “change produced in the surroundings by the
object”—namely the system’s behavior.
The Authors’ starting point is given by the classes of
passive and active behavior. They describe passive behavior as
the one in which “the object is not a source of energy; all the
energy in the output can be traced to the immediate input (e.g.,
the throwing of an object)”. All behavior that is not passive is
active, namely behavior in which “the object is the source of
the output energy involved in a given [change]”. The class of
active behavior can be refined into two subclasses: purposeful
or non-purposeful active behavior. The first subclass identifies
systems that aim at achieving some goal, while the second one
characterizes “random” behaviors—behaviors that is exercised
by systems that are a source of change but whose action does
not serve an apparent purpose. In the latter category we may
have for instance a source of radiations.
The class of purposeful behavior is then decomposed
into two other subclasses: teleological and non-teleological
behavior, the first being characterized by the presence of a
feedback loop by means of which the system can continuously
adjust its action with respect to the intended purpose. Non-
teleological behavior is the one in which said feedback loop
is absent.
In the companion paper [5], systems capable of teleological
behavior have been described as reactive systems. Obviously
as a prerequisite of reactiveness those systems are open [6]
(namely able to perceive, communicate, and interact with
external systems and the environment.)
Finally, the Authors differentiate teleological behavior into
yet another couple of sub-classes: extrapolatory and non-
extrapolatory behaviors. In the former case the system is capa-
ble of advanced apperception, which we defined in [7] as “the
ability to construct theories about the current and related past
situations with which to drive system evolution”. In practice
extrapolatory behaviors are those in which the feedback loop
is governed by the hypothesized future state of the goal—
for instance, its position. Moreover, in extrapolatory behaviors
the hypothesis is drawn on the basis of one or more context
figures. Extrapolatory systems are thus not merely able to
perceive the environment they are deployed in—they are also
able to store in some form the perception data; continuously
correlate past and new data; create a model to predict the
future state; and use that model to steer the action of their
feedback loop. Extrapolatory behavior is thus proactive [5]
and corresponds to the so-called MAPE-K loop-systems of
autonomic computing [8]. The Authors call the number of
context figures used in the predictive model “the order” of the
behavior, which constitutes a final sub-classification in their
treatise.
A. Conclusions
As observed by the Authors, a major consequence of the
behavioristic approach is given by the fact that it does “omit the
specific structure and the intrinsic organization” of the systems
under scrutiny and only focuses on the action produced by
the system. The model proposed by Wiener et al. thus does
not concern itself with the nature of the system or its design:
in fact it may be applied to any “object” (the Authors’ term
for “system”), be it natural or artificial, hardware or software,
individual or collective, or any mixture thereof. The only
important figure in their discussion is the observed behavior,
namely “the examination of the output of the object and of the
relations of this output to the input.”
The behavioral gestalt, for the first time applied also to
artificial entities, provides researcher with a powerful tool to
reason about the quality of systems anticipating in particu-
lar results such as autonomic computing, dependability, and
resilience. The significance of the work of Wiener in the
21st Century may be also exemplified through recent works
as the companion paper [5], which proposes a behavioral
interpretation of the concept of system-environment fit and
suggests its use to let systems manage their own resilience
provisions.
III. ORGANIZATION
A similar approach to Wiener’s is followed by Kenneth
Boulding, who in addition to behavioral features also focuses
his attention on the organizational characteristics of systems
both natural and artificial [2]. Boulding suggests an “arrange-
ment of levels of theoretical discourse,” which he names after
systems best-representing each level: “Thermostat”, “Cell”,
“Plant”, “Animal”, “Human Being”, and others.
As already mentioned, the accent in Boulding is not only
behavioral; this makes it possible to highlight in particular
aspects such as the openness of the system [6]; its ability to
be not just aware but also self-aware; as well as the ability to
enact collective forms of behaviors.
An important addition in Boulding’s system with respect
to Wiener’s is given by the new class of “social organization”,
namely systems composed by “a set of roles tied together with
channels of communication”. The new class corresponds to
social behavior, which may in fact be the subject of a classifica-
tion of its own2. Rather than a separate class, social behaviors
may be interpreted as an attribute of the behavioral classes
of [3] and in fact could be used as a second “coordinate” for
a general classification of behaviors.
Boulding also introduces a final class, consisting of hypo-
thetical systems whose organization and behaviors are beyond
those of the class of Human Beings. Such “Transcendental
systems” are useful for a discussion of the quality of systems
as they represent a reference point as exemplified, e.g., in [7].
A. Conclusions
As mentioned already, Boulding’s gestalt incorporates and
extends Wiener’s, thus several of the considerations we stated
in Sect. II-A apply here too. An important additional research
direction naturally stemming from the Boulding system is the
dense contemporary “corpus” of research that focuses on social
organizations, social systems, and social behaviors, including
human and machine ecological aspects.
IV. SUBSTANCE
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question.
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.
The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock
T.S. ELIOT
A different and more direct approach is the one proposed
by Leibniz and anticipated, to a much lesser extent, by Aris-
totle and Pythagoras. In both Aristotle and Leibniz, the accent
is also put on behaviors but more so on the systems producing
them: the substance. Aristotle calls substance “a subject that
underwent change”, which is a definition surprisingly similar
2More information on this is available, for instance, through [9].
to that of Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow. And Aristotle
too distinguishes passive and active-behaviored substances and
calls the latter as entelechies: substances that “bring about
their own changes from one state to another”. As recalled in
Sect. II, this is in fact the same initial step taken by Wiener
et al. when laying the foundation of their behavioral method.
Leibniz makes this concept and term his own and also refers to
substance as entelechy, namely “a source of actions, or rather,
its own actions” [10]; but he introduces several novel ideas3. So
many and intertwined are those ideas4 that it is rather difficult
to expose them in a satisfactory unitarian way. In what follows
we will not attempt such a titanic task but rather will try to
build a concise model of a subset of those aspects that best
match the themes of the present contribution.
A. Substances as Interconnected Networks
In Leibniz, substances are fully interconnected networks
of all-open, all-aware active-behaviored “nodes” (viz., ent-
elechies) whose behaviors depend deterministically on the
influence exercised by all other nodes. The term “influence”
refers here to a general Law, called by Leibniz the Princi-
ple of Concomitance, stating that a pre-established harmony
exists among all substances. Though this harmony among
substances is perfect, substances perceive other substances
depending on some finite quality called “clarity of perception”
(or representation)—sort of a metric function measuring a
“perception distance” between any two substances.
Depending on the clarity of perception substances may
influence each other differently. When the influence is very
strong the involved substances are said to “embody”. Embod-
iment means that a set of substances are so much mutually in
perceptive relation with one another (so much “in harmony,”
so to say) that they give raise to a new, social substance.
The social substance is represented by a controlling substance,
which Leibniz calls “Mind”. When substances are embodied
the mutual influence is so strong that, e.g., stimuli travel
quickly from one region of the network to the other, thus
creating a feeling of concomitance for perceived events and
sensations—such as the feeling of pain. To set this concept
with the language of modern technology we may think of a
sensor network whose nodes may directly interact only with
the nodes in wireless reach.
In Leibniz, bodies, minds, and perception—including the
perception of physical matter—are actually a product of the
above concomitance. The principle is valid for all substances
whatever their nature, but the exercised influence may vary
and be felt differently depending on the degree of clarity of
the involved substances. As an example, the energy released
by a star in a far galaxy or a butterfly flapping its wings a
continent away may be so “distant” from us as to exercise
a minimal influence on us—and in fact to go undetected at
all. At the other extreme of the “clarity spectrum”, an offence
experienced by a vital organ would be immediately perceived
3This plurality of ideas is reflected in a plurality of terms to refer to
substances, that Leibniz calls minds, souls, entelechies, and monads depending
on the aspects he wanted to highlight.
4Strickland very eloquently refers to Leibniz’s as to a “piecemeal approach
to the diffusion of his ideas” [10].
by the social substance—in particular, by the Mind—and have
a profound effect on the whole social substance5.
We observe how the above definition extends considerably
that of Boulding’s social organizations that we recalled in
Sect. III, his concept of degree of clarity basically correspond-
ing to that of the communication channels in Boulding. In
fact Leibniz goes much beyond Boulding and even appears to
anticipate (of about three centuries!) several of the ideas of
social constructivism and in particular those of Actor-Network
Theory [11].
The clarity of perception characterizing a substance is not
an absolute and eternal property; rather, it has a finite span after
which the network—the social substance—disintegrates into
its constituent substances: the substance “dies6”. Moreover,
Leibniz observes how the behaviors of a substance in close
relation with a second one may result in centrifugal forces that
distort or dissipate either or both of the substances’ “bodies7”.
B. Substances as All-aware, All-open Systems
As already mentioned, in Leibniz changes “ripple away”
from an originating substance (namely, from the active behav-
iors of an entelechy) and are perceived by all others, albeit with
different effects depending on their mutual “distance”. Being
a general law of all substances, the Principle of Concomitance
implies for Leibniz that all substances must be ready to encode
through some internal representation any of the possible events
occurring outside of them. Leibniz’s conclusions are that
substances must be embedded with a mechanism to represent
and instantly reflect all the possible states of all the substances
in the whole universe. This includes any change of state
due to “rippling”. Leibniz imagines also that this internal
representation-and-reflection (RR) mechanism constitutes the
only method of interaction between substances. Substances are
in fact “a world apart”, as he states. With the terminology of
computer science, we could say that Leibniz imagines that
substances run in separate “process spaces” and that their all-
awareness and their RR mechanism provide an indirect method
of interaction based on an internal representation of the ripples.
It is worth highlighting how the idea of an internal model,
or representation, of the external world, which of course is
very much influenced from Plato’s Cave, closely corresponds
to the modern concept of qualia as introduced, e.g., in [12]
and discussed in [7], [13]8.
In fact, Leibniz asserts, even the production of a new
qualia state produces a change; and that change also “ripples”,
as any other behavior, from the originating substance to all
others, leaving a footprint that is proportional to the degree of
clarity between substances. I like to refer to the overall effect
5Obviously the Leibnitian concept of a degree of clarity has little to do with
the familiar notion of geometrical distance.
6Think again of the nodes of a sensor network deployed in unmanned
territory and running on batteries; if batteries discharge beyond the possibility
to transmit, the “social substance” collapses into a set of individual nodes.
7Crosstalk or adjacent-channel interference may be used to exemplify this
concept.
8In particular, from [13]: “sensors [..] reflect a given subset of the worlds
raw facts into internal representations that are then stored in some form within
the systems processing and control units—its “brains”. Qualia is the name used
in literature to refer to such representations.”
of these reflections and reactive behaviors as to a gigantic
“metaphysical storm.”9
C. Substances as Conceptual Models
We said already that in Leibniz substance is a unicity.
He adds that substances are unicities that produce actions “in
accordance with their own individual concepts”. What makes
each and every substance unique and different from all others
is indeed the concept of that substance: its identity, which
makes it in-dividual, namely conceptually non-divisible. In
other words a substance is an entity whose concept is so
peculiar and so strong as to shift the attention from its parts
to an emerging unity—from the components to the composed.
“Man,” for instance, is a substance, because it is characterized
by a concept that is so complete and well-defined that we
do not see the complex hierarchies of sub-systems a man
consists of; rather, we just see the product emerging from the
interactions—the social behaviors and systemic features we
could say—of those sub-systems. Once more we can highlight
here the strong link with the philosophy of Pythagoras [14].
Making use of an American vernacular we could say that
the substance of Man is what makes him thick. In fact, this
is precisely what Leibniz asserts: substances are the only
actual form of existence, while the so-called physical world
is nothing but a distorted perception due to a limited “power
of representation”—an argument that clearly reminds of Plato’s
Cave. The only reality is in fact that of substances, and
substances are conceptual models, namely system templates.
One such substance is, for instance, the algorithm of Bubble
Sort: a conceptual unity that results from a network of ancillary
substances in harmony with one another and emerging as a
unequivocally identified substance different from all possible
others. The quality of Bubble Sort is that, quoting Aristotle, it
is “more than the parts it is made of”. The network of ancillary
concepts that constitute Bubble Sort produces a peculiar added
value, a purposeful behavior that results in a method to sort
objects. Thus, Leibniz tells us, Bubble Sort is characterized by
“a certain demand for existence” [10]: it “deserves” to exist.
Of course other substances exist whose collective emerging
behavior results in a similar service. Quick Sort is indeed
another such substance, and it is also characterized by its
own “claim to existence” [10]. Depending on the “systemic
quality” of similar substances, some of them are “conceived10”
by “God,” namely selected for existence, while some others
are discarded—for instance due either to limitations or to
some “natural” tendency towards elegance and conciseness.
Another reason for the selection of a substance is given by the
fact that “not all possible substances are compossible” [10],
viz. mutually compatible. Two examples of this compossibility
come to mind:
• An “Ultimate Predator” substance would prohibit the
existence of other “prey substances” and eventually
result in its own demise—as can be inferred from
the Lotka-Volterra equations. Thus nature—or, for
Leibniz, “God”—prevents such a “compossibility” to
occur.
9For the Reader accustomed to the Twitter social system a way to represent
such “storm” would be that of considering a circle of users that consistently
re-tweets any message received by the members of the circle—including re-
tweet notifications!
10From concipere, whose meanings include “to become pregnant” [15].
• The axioms in geometry E and the theorems that one
can demonstrate in it are compossible concepts in E,
but may well be that certain concepts that are “valid”
in E may contradict the concepts in another geometry
¬E; thus they would be not compossible in ¬E.
Remarkably enough, we can observe once more how the
above concept of a “systemic quality” introduces a classifica-
tion:
• Certain substances, e.g., Bubble Sort or Quick Sort,
exhibit no form of awareness. In other words, they
construct no model whatsoever of themselves or their
environment. They correspond to Wiener’s servo-
mechanisms and are only capable of purposeful be-
haviors.
• Other substances, such as Cells and Plants, are char-
acterized by primitive and very limited forms of
awareness and “openness” [6]. They are only able to
construct a very limited model of their “world” and
strive towards basic teleological goals—for instance,
survival.
• Yet others, such as Animals, have primitive forms of
self-awareness. Their model of the physical reality
is more complex and translates in simple proactive
behaviors. A limited model of the “self” is also under
their grasp.
• Substance Man reaches an even greater ability to exert
complex behaviors and reach high degrees of self-
awareness and consciousness. Man in fact is even able
to reason about the nature of substances and construct
theories—such as Leibniz’s—about the working of the
ultimate “network of networks”—the universe.
As one can clearly realize, this results in a general systemic
classification—a general systems theory—not dissimilar from
Boulding’s and Wiener’s. Substances are characterized by dif-
ferent “fidelity”, which we defined in [16] as “the compliance
between corresponding figures of interest in two separate but
communicating domains”. These two domains in Leibniz are
actually the Qualia world and the Physical world, the former
being the result of the RR mechanism introduced in IV-B while
the latter is the metaphysical reality—what Leibniz considered
to be “the Mind of God”. It is there that conceptual models are
conceived and it is from there that they are “set in motion.”
We observe how the above concept of substance as a model
is in fact very much intertwined with that of its uniqueness
and identity. Substance is a peculiar and well-defined “logic”
that is different from all others—as in Aristotle’s concept of
definition. Aristotelian entelechy is in fact also the ability to
retain this identity11. As already mentioned, any substance,
e.g. Bubble Sort, is a concept that is itself and no other one—
a unique concept in other words, in that modifying it even
slightly would turn it into something else—a variant.
Leibniz dreamed of a knowledge representation language
in which any conceptual model—any substance—would have
been expressed, and of a tool to verify “mechanically” the
11Sachs [17] translates entelechy as “being-at-work” while “staying-the-
same”: “a source of actions, or rather its own actions” [10] that strives to
retain its identity—namely its peculiar conceptual foundations.
validity of predicates expressed in that language and requiring
evaluation (so-called contingent truths). He called Character-
istica Universalis (C∪) the language and Calculus Ratioci-
nator the tool. C∪ was a diagrammatic language employing
pictograms. The pictograms were convenient representations
of modular knowledge of any scale, with segments repre-
senting different properties—for instance compossibility or
non-compossibility. Leibniz exemplified this with well-known
diagrams such as the one on the frontispiece of his De Arte
Combinatorica. There the four basic Aristotelian components
are depicted together with lines stating whether any couple of
components would be compossible or otherwise, as well as
which properties would emerge from their union.
The C∪ language is Leibniz’s way to represent substances
as networks of other substances, together with their relation-
ships. Pictograms represent modules, namely knowledge com-
ponents packaging other ancillary knowledge components. In
other words, pictograms are Leibniz’s equivalent of Lovelace’s
and Turing’s tables of instructions; of subroutines in program-
ming languages; of boxes in a flowchart; of components in
component-based software engineering12. It is no surprise that
Leibniz observed that “mankind is still not mature enough
to lay claim to the advantages which this method could
provide” [18] and that “a far greater secret lies hidden in our
understanding, of which these are but the shadows” [19].
As we already mentioned, compossibility and quality de-
termine a substance’s claim for existence. But the evaluation
of compossibility and especially quality calls for matching the
substance with external conditions—an environment. This con-
cept is strikingly in line with the methodological assumption
in our companion paper [5]:
“Our starting point here is the conjecture that [quality] is
no absolute figure; rather, it is the result of a match with
a deployment environment.”
Remarkably enough, Leibniz introduces the same method-
ological assumption. A fair selection of a coherent set of
compossible substances requires a complete assessment of the
quality of its constituents; but the only way to achieve such
a complete assessment is by confronting the substances with
a vast amount of environmental conditions and checking their
individual and collective behaviors. The “open variables” in
the substances—corresponding to variables in C∪ language
“scripts”—are then grounded with respect to various contex-
tual conditions. This operation is called by Leibniz unpacking
and corresponds to solving a logic expression by assigning
“facts” (truth values) to its open variables until the expression
becomes either a tautology or a contradiction. Substances are
thus concepts, or better, “scripts,” expressed in C∪ language13.
12It is also intriguing to observe how compossibility and non-compossibility
correspond to the concept of component interfaces. Figure 2 exemplifies this
with a component application for encrypted data communication.
13In fact Leibniz considers substances as “second-order” scripts in that they
are the product of a first-order script, similarly to the spermatic animalcules
theorized by Thonis van Leeuwenhoek. Leeuwenhoek, also known as the
Father of Microbiology, was the first to observe spermatozoa. He was also
the grand developer of preformationism, in turn derived from Pythagoras
and Aristotle. Preformationism states that all beings are the development of
preformed miniature-versions—the above mentioned animalcules. Figure 1
exemplifies preformationism showing a homunculus within a spermatozoon.
Leibniz visited van Leeuwenhoek and was a convinced believer of his theories,
which he adopted in his own System.
Fig. 1. Preformationism exemplified by Nicolaas Hartsoecker, 1695. Image
from the Wikimedia Commons.
The assessment is not just individual in that it is also
applied, “by construction” so to say, to the whole current
set of compossibles—namely, to the whole current ecosystem
of substances. As mentioned already, through the so-called
“rippling” assigned facts are propagated to all other substances
as in a sort of “universal gossiping” [20] among the nodes in
a sensor network. Compossibles are confronted and selected
also considering their entelechy, namely their ability to retain
their conceptual identity [17]—with the terminology of modern
computer science, their resilience [21].
Another criterion for the mentioned ecosystem-wide as-
sessment is given by the fact that the receptivity of the world
is limited and “God”, namely “a certain divine mathemat-
ics” [22], aims “naturally” at making the best of the available
resources. The words of Leibniz are particularly remarkable:
“Out of the infinite combinations of possibles, and possible
series, there exists one through which the greatest amount
of essence or possibility is brought into existence. There
is always in things a principle of determination which
must be sought in maximum and minimum; namely, that
the greatest effect should be produced with the least
expenditure, so to speak. And here the time, the place,
or in a word the receptivity or capacity of the world,
can be considered as the expenditure or the land on which
a building is to be constructed as fittingly as possible,
while the variety of forms correspond to the fitness of
the building and to the number and elegance of its rooms.
And the situation is like that in certain games where all
the spaces on the board are to be filled according to
certain rules, and where, unless you use some skill, you
will in the end be excluded from certain spaces and forced
to leave more spaces empty than you could have or wished
to. But there is a definite rule through which the maximum
number of spaces is most easily filled. [. . . ] In short it is
just like tiles that are arranged so that as many as possible
occupy a given area [10].”
For this author it is remarkable how in such a relatively
limited passage Leibniz condenses so large a variety of con-
cepts and ideas whose significance is particularly apparent
in our modern times. He discusses of limited receptivity—a
concept which reminds of the ideas expressed in the renowned
“Tragedy of the Commons” paper [23]; of system-environment
fit—the cornerstone of our discussion in our companion pa-
per [5]; and his vision of the world as a board game leads
naturally to concepts such as cellular automata, virtual reality,
multi-agent systems, and artificial life. Moreover, his criterion
of reaching as great a variety as possible among substances
matches remarkably well the results discussed, e.g., in [9],
[24], namely the key role played by diversity and disparity in
the survival of biological (and digital [25]) ecosystems.
D. The Substance Scheduler
As mentioned already, Leibniz conjectures the existence of
a transcendental entity—a “God”. As in Boulding, said entity
represents the highest level in the gestalt hierarchy. But while
in Boulding this concept is left unexplored, in Leibniz it is
justified through a series of logic deductions that follow from
the very postulates of his system.
The very first of such deductions is stated through the
following famous quote:
All substances “subsist in the mind of God” [10].
The elements so far introduced allow us to attempt a daring
interpretation of the above sentence: the Leibnitian God is
yet another substance, namely a network of substances with
a central organization and a central “hub” that embodies (we
could say, “punctualizes” [11]) the whole network into a
unique and in-dividual concept (cf. Sect. IV-A). The Mind of
such network is God, and the matter emerging from its union
is the world.
Stated in other words, God is the largest possible network
of networks—the largest possible “scale” in a gigantic recur-
sive structure that spans an entire theory of concepts. One may
possibly visualize this through the image of an enormous mind-
map connecting, e.g., all the arithmetically derivable concepts,
and with a predefined Center representing the whole system—
in this example, the concept of Arithmetic. Furthermore, in
Leibniz it follows that God is the central controller of the
universe; a substance so perfect as to have the utmost clarity
of representation of all the other substances whatever their
scale (whatever their level of recursive nesting, that is). The
most perfect substance thus; but a substance nevertheless,
hence a concept (cf. Sect. IV-C); hence, the executor of a
“function”. To Leibniz this function can only be Ultimate
Sort: a “procedure” for the optimal scheduling-for-existence
of the available concepts. Thus God is an ordinateur, or an
operating system if you like, who manages a limited process
space and selects process images to be deployed and executed
onto the Bare Machine. A task, says Leibniz, not dissimilar to
that of a player of a board game in which the goal is being
able to “maximize the returns”, namely the overall quality,
by choosing the best and allocating the most compossible
substances to have “on board”. God14 is therefore a sorting
algorithm and his data structures are the substances and the
world—in particular its intrinsic limitations and current state.
Ultimate Sort is written in C∪ language and is to be executed
on a compliant machine—the already mentioned “Calculus
14Here the outstanding question is obviously: is the God we are talking
about the ultimate level or merely the next level in a metaphysical hierarchy?
Is he actually “God” or merely a demiurge—a public agent? Is he the One or
his middleware?
Ratiocinator”, interpreted here as an execution engine for C∪
language scripts.
So logic and coherent is Leibniz’s discussion that by
considering the major elements of the Leibnitian system briefly
summarized in this section it is possible to formulate a (non-
pictorial) pseudo-code for Ultimate Sort as stated in Table I.
E. Conclusions
Our major lessons learned from the above discussion may
be summarized as follows: substance is in Leibniz also a
module—a concept-network packaging a quantum of knowl-
edge that becomes a new “digit”, a new concept so unitary and
indivisible as to admit a new pictorial representation, a new and
unique monad-symbol. C∪ is the “general algebra in which all
truths of reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus” [19].
The fundamental properties of such language are:
• First, its being compositional and modular by con-
struction15. In other words, it is an isomorphic lan-
guage, such that concepts are preserved through their
compositions.
• Secondly, its ability to reflect God’s “greater secret,”
through which “a fundamental knowledge of all things
will be obtained” [28]. What is this secret, what is this
fundamental knowledge? We conjecture this secret to
be what Leibniz calls art of complication: “when the
tables of categories of our art of complication have
been formed, something greater will emerge” (ibid.)
In other words, God’s greater secret is the ability
intrinsic in nature’s “divine mathematics” to construct
“naturally” ever more complex structures, ever more
evolved substances [33].
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever happens in a piece of music is nothing but the
endless reshaping of a basic shape. Or, in other words,
there is nothing in a piece of music but what comes
from the theme, springs from it and can be traced back
to it; to put it still more severely, nothing but the theme
itself. Or, all the shapes appearing in a piece of music
are foreseen in the “theme.”
ARNOLD SCHOENBERG [29]
We have described elements of three general systems
theories by focusing on their conceptual touchstones—their
gestalts. As anticipated by Boulding, each gestalt helps discuss
a peculiar aspect of a family of systems and “directs research
towards the gaps that it reveals”. Particular attention has been
devoted to substance, the gestalt at the core of the Leibnitian
treatise. We have highlighted how several key ideas of modern
science may find their foundation in the system of Leibniz—
including, e.g., virtual reality, artificial life, genetic program-
ming, autonomic computing, component-based software en-
gineering, knowledge representation languages, automatic de-
duction, cyber-physical things, and cyber-physical societies. In
15For Leibniz C∪ is the language of the “true characteristic [of substances,]
which would express the composition of concepts by the combination of
signs representing their simple elements, such that the correspondence be-
tween composite ideas and their symbols would be natural and no longer
conventional” [27].
Fig. 2. The well-known diagram in the frontispiece of Leibniz’s De Arte
Combinatorica reinterpreted in view of component-based software engineer-
ing. Interface color represents compatibility/compossibility: different colors
imply interface incompatibility (corresponding to pictogram incompatibility
and substance non-compossibility).
Procedure USort (S, W )
/* S is the set of all substances */
/* W is a variable reflecting [26] the state of the current world */
begin
01 Parallel Do
02 At Individual Level
03 For All s ∈ S Do
/* IntrinsicQuality returns the static component of substance quality */
/* This may include, e.g., the behavioral class of s (cf. Sect. II), */
/* or the Boulding level of s (cf. Sect. III), */
/* or other architectural/organizational/behavioral characteristics. */
04 i← IntrinsicQuality(s);
/* ExtrinsicQuality returns the dynamic component of substance quality */
/* It calls Unpack(s, W ) to execute s with environmental conditions as in W. */
/* Variables of s requiring the truth value of contingent truths are thus resolved. */
05 e← ExtrinsicQuality(s, W );
/* IndividualQuality returns a substance’s overall quality */
/* this corresponds to the concept of system-environment fit */
/* as defined in the companion paper [5]. */
06 s.q ← IndividualQuality(i, e);
07 End For
08 End Level
09 At Social Level
/* If W allows another substance to be deployed. . . */
10 if Receptivity(W) > 0 then
/* . . . a compossible substance of highest individual quality is selected. . . */
11 s← SelectForExistence(S);
/* . . . and deployed in W. */
12 Deploy(s);
13 else
/* If W has reached its limits then we need to make room. */
/* We select the substance that has the “worst-quality” with respect to */
/* IndividualQuality and world-specific criteria (minimal loss of */
/* diversity and disparity [9], [25], maximal “cost” in terms */
/* of world space requirements, etc.) */
14 s← SelectForDestruction(S);
/* The minimum-quality existing substance is purged. */
15 Undeploy(s);
16 end if
17 End Level
18 End Do
end.
TABLE I. PSEUDO-CODE OF LEIBNIZ’S ULTIMATE SORT.
particular we put the accent on knowledge representation and
knowledge processing—namely on the concept of C∪ language
and Calculus Ratiocinator engine—which Leibniz considered
as the key tools for “that science in which are treated the
forms or formulas of things in general, that is, quality in
general” [19]—in other words, General Systems Theory.
In this final section we like to acknowledge our personal
debt with the system of Leibniz in two of our own recent
research directions,
A first example may be found in companion paper [5]. In
that work we introduce an intrinsic quality parameter given
by the behavioral class of the system under scrutiny. This
corresponds to Statement 04 in Table I, in which the substance
scheduler evaluates the intrinsic quality of a substance. We
also define a system-environment fit—which corresponds to
evaluating a substance’s extrinsic quality, or the quality under
specific external conditions. This is the same as in State-
ment 05 in Table I: a behavioral implementation of function
“ExtrinsicQuality” may be in fact that exemplified in Fig. 2 of
the companion paper.
A second example is in the work presented in [30] and
anticipated by the mathematical models of the HeartQuake
game [31] and of permutation numbers [32]. In those articles
we considered the “movements” produced respectively by
deterministic game procedures; by the permutations of a fixed
“population” of digits; and by the non-deterministic arrange-
ments of actants that respond to the onset of environmental
conditions—such as natural or man-induced disasters. The
graphs representing the collection of all possible arrangements
are indeed networks of “concepts” embedding other concepts
into recursive structures that, through some divine mathemat-
ics, result in self-similar “matryoshka doll” graphs such as the
one exemplified in Fig. 3. The modular structure in that figure
is in fact the pictorial expansion of string “001123344”—a 5-
pictogram representation of a substance if you like. As that
string includes in itself a number of sub-strings, likewise its
expansion includes the expansions of its sub-strings, with a
conservation of modularity that reminds of the results in [33].
This provides a geometrical interpretation of Leibniz’s vision
of the monads as networks of substances emerging and “de-
scending” from a central concept—what Schoenberg would
probably refer to as a “theme” [29] a whole composition
springs from and may be traced back to. An example of this
principle is given by musical compositions such as Ostinato
011112333 [34]—a musical rendition of the very same “divine
mathematics” presented in Fig. 3 but this time springing from
substance “011112333”. Every single note expressed in the
mentioned composition derives in fact deterministically from
its “theme”, string 011112333.
As a final remark we would like to draw once more the
attention of the reader to van Leeuwenhoek and his theory of
preformationism—a theory that was enthusiastically accepted
by Leibniz and never doubted in the course of his whole
life [10]. We conjecture that the main reason for this may be
that, though obviously an incorrect and unscientific concept,
preformationism contains in nuce a quite modern and “sci-
entifically discussed” concept, namely the already mentioned
principle of conservation of modularity, viz. the property of
conserving modularization when passing from a genotypical
representation (viz. a concept, namely an abstract and general
template) to a phenotypical representation (namely a particular
“realization”, or concrete expansion, of that template) [33].
This property, which may be probably best represented through
the mathematical concept of an isomorphism between geno-
typical and phenotypical algebraic domains, is in fact com-
patible with the Leibnitian vision of substances as “second-
order scripts” produced by “first-order scripts”. As already
mentioned, this conservation of modularity possibly hints at
the “greater secret” hinted at by Leibniz, namely the reasons
why evolution “evolves”, and why nature “naturally” develops
ever more complex substances.
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